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Kansas Law Review
KANSAS LABOR LAW AND DISTRICT COURT
INJUNCTIONS
Dan Hopson, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
Most Kansas lawyers have never tried a labor law case. Consequently,
they are not familiar with the current doctrine enunciated by the courts
and legislatures. As former Chief Justice Smith observed, "The field is
new."' Since World War II, this state has experienced extensive industrial
expansion. Over 1,000 new industries have been established in Kansas since
1940.2 The 1956 Kansas Directory of Manufacturers lists 3,200 manufac-
turing companies. With the merger of the Congress of Industrial Organi-
zation and the American Federation of Labor in 1955, the unions of this
country have solidified their position and can now expand. The increased
industrialization of Kansas will make it a fertile field for organizational
efforts.' Kansas lawyers will be forced to re-examine the current doctrine in
order to advise their clients, employers or employees, of their respective
rights and liabilities.
In the early part of this century, Kansas was a leader in the develop-
ment of labor legislation, and several decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court construing Kansas law became landmarks.' But after Gilt-
ner v. Becker in 1931,' which discussed the use of injunctions against
union organizational efforts, the Kansas Supreme Court spoke infre-
quently in labor matters. Other than the four very recent cases on the
pre-emption doctrine' and the one case deciding the right of a union
*Assistant Dean, University of Kansas School of Law. A.B. 1951, LL.B. 1953, Kan. Univ.;
LL.M. 1954, Yale Univ.
'Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Johnson, 178 Kan. 405, 414, 286 P.2d 182, 189 (1955).
2 KETZEL, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN KANSAS (Bulletin of the Governmental Research Center,
Kansas University, Vol. XII, No. 5, 1957).
In personal conversations with the author, several labor leaders have indicated that the unions
were starting organizational drives. The large increase in labor litigation in the last two or three
years may well be a result of such efforts.
' See the Court of Industrial Relations Act, KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-601 to 628. Dorchy v. Kansas,
272 U.S. 306 (1926); Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522
(1923); And see Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). These cases are discussed in note 35 infra.
6 133 Kan. 170, 298 P.2d 780 (1931).
'City Motors v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge 778, AFL, 179 Kan. 157, 292 P.2d 1102
(1956); Kaw Paving Co. v. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, Local 101, AFL, 178 Kan. 467,
290 P.2d 110 (1955); Texas Constr. Co. v. Hoisting & P.E. Local 101, AFL, 178 Kan. 422, 286
P.2d 160 (1955); and Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 576 v. Johnson, 178 Kan. 405, 286 P.2d
182 (1955).
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to induce a breach of contract when exercising union discipline,7 the
court has only answered peripheral questions.' It has spoken on the right
to sue on a union contract,9 the liability of a union to suit by its members,1"
the right of a union to discipline its members," and an early pre-emption
problem. 2 Consequently the Kansas court has interpreted only minor
sections of the Kansas Labor-Management Relations Act of 1943"s and the
1955 amendments to that Act. 4
[After the printer received this article, the Kansas Supreme Court
handed down three opinions on October 5, 1957,1"" and one on October
9, 1957,"' discussing Kansas labor law and its relation to federal law.
Although this writer has read these opinions in their typewritten form,
they will not be analyzed in detail nor will the tone of the article be
changed to conform to the fact that the Kansas Supreme Court has in-
creased the slim corpus of state labor law.
Three of these cases involve the doctrine of pre-emption as applied
to state court injunctions, while the other determined the legality of
"organizational picketing" under the Kansas Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act, as amended.14c A discussion of these holdings is added to the
existing discussion of these topics as they appear in this paper.]
Since 1931, the United States has experienced a substantial change
in labor-management relations, both factually and legally. Congress has
passed the Norris-La Guardia Act 5 and the Wagner Act" with its 1947
Taft-Hartley Amendments.' 7 Both federal and state courts have decided
hundreds of cases delineating the limits of permissible conduct in labor-
management conflict. Kansas started strong, but has rested on the back
stretch. Perhaps the state will reassert leadership on the far turn.
One of the problems in determining what is proper for a union or
employer is the lack of appellate decisions. The law's delay works a
" Radio Station KFH v. Musicians Union, Local 297, AFM, 169 Kan. 596, 220 P.2d 199 (1950).
:This is no longer true. See text circa note 14 infra.
'Swart v. Huston, 154 Kan. 182, 117 P.2d 576 (1941).
"Porth v. Local Union 201, 171 Kan. 177; 231 P.2d 252 (1951); Zane v. Int'l Hod Carriers,
155 Kan. 87, 122 P.2d 715 (1942).
"Flynn v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, III Kan. 415, 207 Pac. 829 (1922). Cl. Radio
Station KFH v. Musicians Union, Local 297, AFM, 169 Kan. 596, 220 P.2d 199 (1950); Porth v.
Local Union 201, 166 Kan. 166, 199 P.2d 788 (1948).
"Kelly v. Grimshaw, 161 Kan. 253, 167 P.2d 627 (1946).
lKAN. G.S. 1949, 44-802 to 815.
"4KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-802 to 817.
14a Asphalt Paving Inc. v. Teamsters Union, Local 795, No. 40,282; Bender v. Constr. and
Gen. Laborers, Local 685, No. 40,520; Friesen v. Gen. Team and Truck Drivers, Local 54,
No. 40,247. Opinions are on file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Topeka, Kansas.
14b Stieben v. Constr. and Gen. Laborers, Local 685, No. 40,514; opinion on file with the
Clerk of the Supreme Court, Topeka, Kansas.
" Kan. G.S. 1949, 44-802 to 815, as amended by Kan. G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-802 to 817.
"47 STAT. 90 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1952).
1049 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. 5§ 151-163, 181-188 (1952).
"61 STAT. 136 (1947) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 29 and 50 U.S.C. (1952)).
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special hardship in labor cases. If a strike or picket line is enjoined, the
unions lose. If it is denied, management will probably settle. In either
case, there is little pressure to obtain a "correct" ruling from the state su-
preme court. Only when a union desires to get an authoritative holding
for future activity will it appeal.
The Kansas lawyer is then faced with a considerable problem. Since
the Kansas Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to tell him what
it considers unlawful behavior on the part of management, or more
especially on the part of labor, the only authoritative interpretation avail-
able is that rendered by Kansas district courts in deciding labor injunc-
tion cases. It is the district court judges who must and who are interpret-
ing the Act. Furthermore, it is in this area of the law, more than most
others, that the actual practices of the district courts are of importance.
Abstract rules make little difference when the delay of appellate review
renders it ineffective.'"
Since district court opinions are not reported, the only feasible method
of obtaining labor injunction decisions is by an examination of the court
files.' 9 All of the district judges were therefore contacted, and many
.expressed an interest in the project and offered to help. Eight judges sent
in data on fourteen cases, while others indicated that they had heard no
labor cases. Several law students examined the court files and found nine
cases. In the four pre-emption cases which reached the Kansas Supreme
Court,"° the district courts' opinions were available and examined. One
district court opinion had been published in the Kansas Law Review.2'
' The United States Congress realized this problem and attempted to discover how the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was actually working. They hired four law schools, Wisconsin, U.C.L.A., Duke
and Cornell, to make a study of the practices of district courts. For the results and an account
of the difficulties in finding the material, see Senate Sub-Committee on Labor Management Rela-
tions, State Court Injunctions, S. Doc. No. 7, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
"s To obtain these decisions, the students taking the labor law course at Kansas University in
the spring of 1956 checked at the clerk of the district court's office in their home counties during
the spring vacation. Nine cases were found and reported with varying degrees of completeness.
During the summer of 1956, personal letters were sent to each district court judge soliciting his
aid. Again, in February of this year, a second letter was sent. Altogether, nineteen judges answered
one or both of these solicitations.
Letters were received from the following judges: Joseph J. Dawes, First Judicial District; Paul
H. Heinz, Third Judicial District; Harry W. Fisher, Sixth Judicial District; B. M. Dunham, Seventh
Judicial District; John L. Kirkpatrick, Clayton Brenner, Raymond H. Carr, Tenth Judicial
District; George S. Reynolds, Thirteenth Judicial District; Hal Hyler, Sixteenth Judicial District;
Robert W. Hemphill, Seventeenth Judicial District; William C. Kandt, Eighteenth, Judicial District;
Lewis L. McLaughlin, Twenty-first Judicial District; William H. McHale, Harry G. Miller, Willard
M. Benton, Twenty-ninth Judicial District; A. R. Buzick, Thirtieth Judicial District; Roland H.
Tate, Thirty-second Judicial District; Spencer A. Gard, Thirty-seventh Judicial District; and John
Fontron, Fortieth Judicial District. Judges A. K. Stavely of Lyndon, C. E. Birney of Hill City
and Donald T. Magaw of Osborne all said that they had heard no labor cases, but would send in
reports of any cases decided by them in the future.
w See note 6 supra.
The four district court opinions, appeals from which were decided by the Kansas Supreme
Court on October 5 and 9, 1957, were already included in this survey.
. 3 KAN. L. REv. 76 (1954).
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A survey of the briefs filed with the Kansas Supreme Court provided
some data on three other cases.
Altogether then, a greater or lesser amount of information exists in
twenty-six labor injunction cases. While the number of judges responding
was only 43.3 per cent of the total contacted, 2 most of these are from
eastern Kansas. And when their decisions are added to those obtained
through the Supreme Court briefs and district court files, it would
appear that a substantial number of the last two or three years' cases were
obtained and are herein reported.
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF KANSAS LABOR LAW
Before discussing the district court cases, some background material
should be covered. Kansas labor litigation starts with Brick Co. v. Perry,"
decided in 1904, where the court invalidated an 1897 statute making it
a crime to discharge an employee because he belonged to a labor union.24
The court felt that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. Subsequently, the legislature changed
the statute to say that it would be unlawful to coerce or induce an
employee into signing a "yellow dog" contract,25 but said nothing about
discharge. In Kansas v. Coppage in 1912,26 the Kansas court attempted
to distinguish the Brick Co. case and Adair V. United States,27 which
involved a similar federal statute prohibiting discharge. But this was
reversed by the United States Supreme Court in Coppage v. Kansas2 on
the ground that the fourteenth amendment gave a constitutional right
to employers and employees to make a "yellow dog" contract. Prior to
the Coppage litigation, the Kansas Court, in Railway v. Brown, ° held
void another 1897 statute requiring an employer to furnish a true dis-
charge letter,"° on the ground that it violated the fourteenth amendment's
freedom to contract.
After World War I, the organized coal miners in southeast Kansas
requested a greater share of the profits. Unrest and violence followed
their demands. Fearful of complete chaos, the Kansas Legislature, called
'Twenty-two out of a total of fifty-one judges.
'69 Kan. 297, 76 Pac. 848 (1904).
'Kan. Sess. Laws 1897, c. 120, S§ 1, 2.
'Kan. Sess. Laws 1903, c. 222, 5S 1, 2. A yellow dog contract is the name given to an
agreement signed by an employee that he will not join a union.
S87 Kan. 752, 125 Pac. 8 (1912), followed per curiam in Kansas v. Ackenhausen, 87 Kan.
792, 125 Pac. 14 (1912).
zr208 U.S. 161 (1908).
'236 U.S. 1 (1914).
'80 Kan. 312, 102 Pac. 459 (1909).
'Kan. Sess. Laws 1897, c. 144.
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to special session in 1920, passed the Court of Industrial Relations Act."1
This act, a forerunner of Mussolini's corporate state concept, attempted to
vest control of all important industry and agriculture, and their labor
relations, in an administrative court. This court had the power to settle
all problems of wages and prices in a "fair" manner. In effect, it pro-
vided for compulsory arbitration and prevented all strikes or lockouts.
The multitude of litigation that followed centered on three factual
situations.
The first was the Dorchy and Howat cases 2 arising out of a series
of strikes in the southeastern Kansas coal fields. The second was the
Wolfi Packing Co. cases, 33 resulting from an attempt by the Court of
Industrial Relations to set wages and hours at a Kansas City packing
company. And the third was the Personett case,34 triggered by a strike on
the Santa Fe Railroad. In these cases the Kansas Supreme Court upheld
the validity of the Act, but the United States Supreme Court ruled other-
wise. The Court said that a state could not regulate an industry not
affected with the public interest and that forcing an arbitration award
and destroying freedom of contract were prohibited by the fourteenth
amendment. However, an injunction based on an "unlawful" strike
to force back payment of wages was independently upheld. The litiga-
tion was long and involved. 5
' Kan. Special Sess. Laws 1920 c. 29. For a discussion of this Act and the conditions that
led to its passage, see GAGLIARDO, KANSAS INDUSTRIAL COURT (1941).
" See note 35 infra.
3Ibid.
" Ibid.
'The first case testing the Court of Industrial Relations Act was State ex rel. v. Howat, 107
Kan. 423, 191 Pac. 585 (1920), where the court held that contempt would lie for refusal to
testify before the Industrial Court. Then, in State ex rel. v. Howat, 109 Kan. 376, 198 Pac. 686(1921), an appeal from a finding of contempt for refusing to obey an injunction issued under the
Act, the court held the Act constitutional, but as an alternative holding said that the district
court's injunction could not be collaterally attacked. In another 1921 case, State ex eI. v. Howat,
109 Kan. 779, 202 Pac. 72 (1921), the court gave no facts, but upheld the injunction on the
authority of the first two Howat cases. On appeal to the United Supreme Court, Howat v. Kansas,
258 U.S. 181 (1922), the two earlier cases were dismissed. The Court stated that it would not
decide the constitutionality of the Act as there were adequate non-federal grounds for dismissing
the state decisions. It was also noted that the Kansas court had construed the Act in yet another
case, and that an appeal to the Supreme Court was pending.
The other case, Court of Industrial Relations v. Wolff Packing Co., 109 Kan. 629, 201 Pac. 418(1921), was decided late in 1921. The Kansas court held the Act constitutional when applied
to the setting of hours and wages of employees of a packing plant. Then, prior to action by the
United States Supreme Court, on a second appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, Court of Industrial
Relations v. Wolff Packing Co., 111 Kan. 501, 207 Pac. 806 (1922), the Kansas court reconstrued
the Act, but again found it constitutional. The United States Supreme Court, in Wolff Packing
Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522 (1923), stated that the second state opinion controlled and
reversed the Kansas court on the grounds that the setting of wages, without either a true showing
of an emergency or that the industry was vested with a public interest, violated freedom of contract
and took property in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
After the III Kansas case, and before the United States Supreme Court reversed it, the
Kansas court upheld another injunction in State v. Howat, 112 Kan. 235, 210 Pac. 352 (1922).
Here the strike was called to force the employer to pay a wage claim of one of the employees,
and the Kansas court held the injunction proper by merely citing the earlier cases. On appeal,
Dorchey v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924), the Supreme Court reversed the Kansas court and said
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The Kansas Legislature also passed an act in 1920 making it a crime to
commit criminal syndicalism or sabotage."6 Construing this Act, the court
held, in State ex rel. v. Industrial Workers of the World,7 that the state
could enjoin the I.W.W. from coming into Kansas. It was immaterial,
said the court, that the I.W.W.'s purpose was to violate the criminal
laws.38 The injunction was needed to protect the people.
Rounding out this early period are three injunction cases. In 1913,
the legislature passed an anti-injunction statute.3" This statute provided
that in disputes concerning conditions of employment between employers
and employees, no injunction should issue unless notice was given, ex-
cept that a seven-day restraining order was proper upon a showing of
irreparable injury.4 ° A bond was required in all cases.4 The injunction
was to be specific and directed at the named person only.42 The final
section," reading almost the same as Section 20 of the Clayton Act44
passed in 1914, prohibited any injunction unless there was irreparable
property damage and, in the second paragraph, allowed no restraining
order or injunction to prevent peaceful strikes, picketing, boycotting or
the paying of strike benefits.
In the first case, Crane v. Snowden," the petition alleged a strike
accompanied by violence. The Kansas Supreme Court sustained the over-
ruling of the defendant's demurrer on the ground that the conduct of
that as part of the Kansas Act had been held unconstitutional in the Wolff case, Kansas must
determine if the Act was separable and if § 19, under which the injunction issued, was con-
stitutional.
While awaiting the Dorchey appeal, the Kansas court attempted to save a part of the Wolff
case by holding, in two separate opinions, Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 114
Kan. 304, 219 Pac. 259 (1923) and 114 Kan. 487, 227 Pac. 249 (1923), that the Industrial
Court orders setting maximum hours were constitutional in that the United States Supreme Court's
prior decision had only talked about wages. The United States Supreme Court again reversed,
Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 267 U.S. 552 (1925), and said that the Kansas court's
distinction was invalid since fixing hours in the context of total regulation violated the fourteenth
amendment.
Not waiting for the final answers from the United States Supreme Court, the Kansas court,
in late 1923, decided State v. Personett, 114 Kan. 680, 220 Pac. 520 (1923). There the court
held that § 17 of the Act, prohibiting picketing, was constitutional or at least that the section
was valid when the picketing was aimed at a common carrier. This case was not appealed. Still
awaiting the Wolff appeal, the Kansas court, in July of 1924, did as the United States Supreme
Court requested in the Dorchey case. It decided that S 19 of the Act, under which the Dorchey
injunction had issued, was separable and constitutional. State v. Howat, 116 Kan. 412, 227 Pac.
752 (1924). On final appeal, the United States Supreme Court, in Dorchey v. Kansas, 272 U.S.
306 (1926), held that there was no constitutional right to strike, and that it was proper for the
state to find the strike unlawful and issue an injunction when the union was attempting to
enforce a stale claim.
8 Kan. Sess. Laws 1920, c. 37.
113 Kan. 347, 214 Pac. 617 (1922).
8 The I.W.W. had argued the old saw that equity would not enjoin a crime.
'KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1104 to 1107.
"
0 KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1104.
' KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1105.
"KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1106.
"
5 KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1107.
"38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. S 52 (1952).
' 112 Kan. 217, 210 Pac. 475 (1922).
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business was a property right and that the statute expressly allowed an
injunction in cases where there was irreparable injury to a property
right. Injury to physical property was not necessary. The court ignored
the more restrictive second paragraph. Apparently it felt that the alle-
gation of violence was sufficient to remove the restrictions of that para-
graph. o
Then in 1925, in Bull v. International Alliance," the court, while
hinting that the whole statute was unconstitutional,47 found the statute
did not apply to the facts of the case. KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1107 states that
no injunction shall be granted in any case "between an employer and
employee, or between employers and employees, or between employees,
or between persons employed and persons seeking employment ...."
The court said that the injunction was not issued against the employees,
but only against the union who was not an employee nor seeking employ-
ment. This statute could not be used to prevent an injunction against
stranger picketing.
Finally, in Giltner v. Becker," the Kansas court liberalized the inter-
pretation of the word "employee" and, following the United States Su-
preme Court in American Foundries v. Tri-County Council,4" which
interpreted the like provision of the Clayton Act,"° held that if the union
members had been recent employees, the court could not issue an injunc-
tion. If the statute was to apply to anyone, employees who had been or
who were seeking employment must be included."'
Actually these three cases tell us little. Not only were they decided
during the period of restrictive court action, but also they only deter-
mined that the conduct of a business was a property right, and that the
word "employee" does not include the union, but does include individuals
who are ex-employees.
" 119 Kan. 713, 241 Pac. 459 (1925).
'The court cited Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), which held unconstitutional an
Arizona statute prohibiting injunctions. However, there is no question today about the constitu-
tionality of an anti-injunction statute. The Truax case has never been formally overruled, but in
Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937), a similar state statute was upheld,
and in Lauf v. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938), the more restrictive Norris-LaGuardia Act
was upheld.
' 133 Kan. 170, 298 P.2d 780 (1931).
'9257 U.S. 184 (1921).
'oSee note 44 supra.
' The court then held that the defendant in the injunction suit could obtain his writ of habeas
corpus since the contempt conviction fell with the denial of the right of the court to issue the
injunction.
While the interpretation of the statute is correct, there is abundant authority to hold that the
issuing of the injunction was not void, but merely erroneous. See Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S.
181 (1922); and for recent authority in the federal courts, see the celebrated case of United States
v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). See also Cox, The Void Order and
the Duty to Obey, 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 86 (1948).
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These cases closed out the first chapter of labor law in Kansas. For
the next nineteen years, the Kansas court remained silent about the law-
fulness of union activity. 2 But the rest of the United States continued to
develop the use of legal controls to limit industrial conflict.
FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Starting with the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932,"3 Congress over-
ruled Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering,54 with its restrictive interpretation
of the Clayton Act, and made explicit to the federal courts that they were
not to issue injunctions in labor disputes except under very narrow condi-
tions. Further, Congress defined labor dispute so broadly that the courts
had no choice but to say that it included controversies between employers
and union members who were not his employees.5
Then in 1935, Congress passed the Wagner Act" and created an en-
tirely new approach. Congress felt that collective bargaining was good,
and to encourage it, declared certain activity on the part of the employer
to be "unfair labor practices."5 7 Congress also stated unequivocally in
Section 7 of Wagner, that employees have the "right to self-organization,
to bargain collectively ... and to engage in other concerted activities
for . . . mutual aid or protection .. .""8 The courts were by-passed.
Responsibility for enforcement was vested in the National Labor Re-
lations Board."
At the close of the depression, the United States Supreme Court itself
aided the development of unions and collective bargaining. In Thornhill
v. Alabama,"° the Court threw a fourteenth amendment free speech pro-
tection around peaceful picketing.6" In the same term, for practical pur-
poses, the Court took unions out from under the restraint of trade prohi-
bition of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 2 Only when the union conspired
' The four cases decided during the nineteen years dealt only with intra-union rights. See notes
9 to 12 supra.
'47 STAT. 90 (1932), 29 U.S.C., § 101-115 (1952).
u 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
SSee Lauf v. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938). Contrast this with the definition in the
Kansas Act, KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1104 to 1107. Kansas never modified its Clayton-like provisions,
so this new board approach need not prevail in Kansas.
mNational Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1952).
8749 STAT. 452 (1935) (later amended by 61 STAT. 140 (1947)), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1952).
"49 STAT. 452 (1935) (later amended by 61 STAT. 140 (1947)), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
"49 STAT. 453 (1935) (later amended by 61 STAT. 146 (1947)), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1952).
310 U.S. 88 (1940).
61 The Court further extended this doctrine in American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S.
321 (1941); Bakery Drivers v. Whol, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); and Cafeteria Employees v. Angelos,
320 U.S. 293 (1943), to protect stranger organizational picketing.
"'26 STAT. 209 (189.0) (as amended), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1952). See Apex Hosier Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1940).
[Vol. 6
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with the employer,63 or was not engaged in a "labor dispute,"64 could it
be held to restrain trade.
During the Second World War the situation remained static, but
with the wave of strikes and unrest in 1946, Congress passed the Taft-
Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act. 5 Now unions, as well as
employers, could be guilty of unfair labor practices.66
The United States Supreme Court also retreated from the broad free-
doms previously given labor unions.67 In 1949, in Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice. Co.,6" the Court held that a state may restrict picketing
without violating free speech, when the object of the picketing was to
violate a valid state law. In a series of cases thereafter,69 culminating in
Local 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers and Steamfitters v.
Graham,7 the Court said, in effect, that within reason, a state could
declare the purpose or means of the picketing unlawful; and, since
picketing was more than mere speech, such a declaration of policy on
the part of a state would not violate the fourteenth amendment. By the
summer of 1957, the Court was willing to hold that a state could deter-
mine that attempted organizational picketing was per se aimed at
coercing the employer to interfere with his employees in their right to
join, or refuse to join, a union, and was therefor unlawful.7'
The Supreme Court also opened the way for restrictive state action
by holding constitutional, in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. North-
western Iron and Metal Co.,72 state "right to work" statutes.73 The Court
admitted that in the early labor cases, such as Adair v. United States"4 and
' Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
14See, e.g., Columbia River Packers v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1943).
' 61 STAT. 136 (1947) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 29 and 50 U.S.C. (1952)).
0061 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)-(6) (1952).
7 Even at the height of these freedoms, the Court said that the states could restrict violence,
Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1940); and limit the
area of the dispute, Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
"336 U.S. 490 (1949).
Bldg. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 11 A.L.R.2d 1330
(1950); Teamsters Union, Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 13 A.L.R.2d 631 (1950); Hughes v.
Superior Court of Cal., 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
70345 U.S. 192 (1953).
'Teamsters Union, Local 695, AFL v. Vogt, Inc., 352 U.S. 817 (1957) (three dissents).
Prior to the Vogt case, scores of professors and lawyers wrote on the problems of free speech and
picketing. Many argued that since the early cases were not overruled, a state could not constitu-
tionally outlaw all picketing. Some argued that the Court would still protect purely organizational
picketing. See, e.g., Smoot, Stranger Picketing: Permanent Injunction or Permanent Litigation?
42 A.B.A.J. 817 (1956). The Vogt case refutes this later argument.
75335 U.S. 525 (1949). This case involved a Nebraska constitutional amendment. In the
same opinion, the court upheld the North Carolina "right to work" statute in Whitaker v. North
Carolina. Simultaneously, in AFL v. American Sash and Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949), the
Arizona statute was upheld.
", "Right to work" statutes provide, in varying language, that it shall be unlawful to have
any form of union security contracts-closed shop, union shop or maintenance of membership. Many
state labor acts outlaw the closed shop, as does the Taft-Hartley Act, but allow some forms of
union security. The issue presented is whether to outlaw all forms.
7'208 U.S. 161 (1908).
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Truax v. Corrigan,7 it had found regulation violating the fourteenth
amendment. However, the philosophy of the Court had changed since
that time, and since states were free to aid unions, they were free to
impose reasonable restrictions.
Pre-emption and the Penumbra
No sooner had the court relaxed constitutional restrictions on state
action, when it prohibited state action through the use of pre-emption.
In Garner v. Teamsters Union, Local 776, AFL the Court held that if
the employer was engaged in interstate commerce, which today includes
almost anyone,77 Congress intended to have his labor relations governed
by the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts. Prior to the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments, the Wagner Act made only employers guilty of unfair labor
practices.7" Therefore it was logical to assume that Congress intended
the states to be free to regulate employees. 9 But then Congress said
employees could also be guilty of unfair labor practices."0 Therefore it
must have meant the states to remain silent, or else there would be no
uniformity of restraint. Besides, Congress had established an admini-
strative board, the N.L.R.B., to handle such problems and a state court's
injunction would interfere. However, the Court felt that Congress did
not mean to pre-empt everything. Between employees' activity protected
by Section 7 of the Act"' and activity prohibited by Sections 8(b)
(1)-(6),2 there lay a penumbra.8 3
What conduct falls within the gray area is an open question. The
Supreme Court has said that violence may be regulated by the states,
8 4
but the theory here is not that such activity lies in the penumbra, but that
the states are free to protect property." Partial strikes are also unpro-
'5257 U.S. 312 (1921); see note 47 supra.
"346 U.S. 485 (1953). See also Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955). And
see Fowks, Labor Law, 5 KAN. L. REv. 277 (1956); Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Rela-
tions, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1297 (1954); Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 1026 (1953).
"For the full reach of the commerce clause, see, e.g., Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322
U.S. 643 (1944); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
See text circa note 154 infra, as to the Kansas Supreme Court's view of what constitutes
"affecting" interstate commerce.
See note 57 supra.
'o But even here, the Court found some pre-emption. The Wagner Act dealt with the procedure
for certification of bargaining agents; therefore the states could not so determine. Bethlehem Steel
Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767 (1947). Certain rights were
guaranteed to employees under Section seven of the Act. See text circa note 58 supra. Therefore
a state could not restrict those rights. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
' See note 66 supra.
' See text circa note 58 supra.
' See note 66 supra.
S'This gray area is discussed by Justice Frankfurter in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348
U.S. 468, 480 (1955).
' United Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956). See
Note, 5 KAN. L. REv. 464 (1956).
'The Supreme Court recognized that violence was also an unfair labor practice. United Auto
Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 270 (1956).
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tected activity that the states may regulate, 6 but the decision arose prior
to the N.L.R.B.'s finding that a partial strike was an unfair labor practice
in that it violated Section 8(b) (3) of Taft-Hartley. 7 In the other types of
cases reaching the United States Supreme Court where lack of pre-
emption was argued, the Court found that the state was pre-empted."s
Assuming that there is at least some activity of a union that falls
within the penumbra, there are other problems that face a state court
in determining how to handle the pre-emption doctrine.
Must the employer first be refused by the N.L.R.B. and then seek a
state court injunction, or may the state court find in the first instance
that the Board would not have jurisdiction? There is some dicta that the
state must wait for the Board," but the Court has also hinted that you
might show to the state court that it was futile to so apply. ° However,
the Court has not told us what "futile" means. Could you show that the
union conduct complained of had never been held by the Board to be an
unfair labor practice, that it had never been held to be protected activity,
or that it did not reasonably fall within either classification? We do not
know."'
Jurisdictional Standards and the "No-Man's Land"
In 1950, the Board, on its own initiative, established so-called juris-
68Int'l Union, United Auto Workers, Local 232, AFL v. WERB., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
8761 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(3) (1952); Personal Products Corp., 108 NLRB
743 (1954).
'In Bus Employees v. WERB, 340 U.S. 383, 398 (1951), the court, in holding pre-empted a
Wisconsin Law providing for compulsory arbitration in local public utilities, said that "the
Wisconsin Act, in forbidding peaceful strikes for higher wages in industries covered by the
Federal Act, has forbidden the exercise of rights protected by § 7 of the Federal Act." In United
Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956), the court found the state of
Louisiana pre-empted when it tried to enjoin peaceful picketing by a majority of the employees
demanding recognition. The court felt that such picketing was a protected right under Section
seven. Even though the union could not use the Board's processes to force the employer to bargain,
since it had not filed its non-communist oath, the employer still had a duty to bargain with, the
majority union and the union could strike to enforce that right. See also the cases cited in note
96 inlra and the discussion below as to other -activity found pre-empted. In one other case, the
Court permitted state action, holding that a state, in the context of violence, could allow common
law damages. United Constr. Workers v. Laburum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
'In Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 481 (1955), the Court stated that "where
the facts reasonably bring the controversy within the section prohibiting these practices, and where
the conduct, if not prohibited by the federal Act, may be reasonably deemed to come within the
protection afforded by that Act, the state court must decline jurisdiction in deference to'the
tribunal which Congress has selected for determining such issues in the first instance." In Local 25,
Teamsters Union v. New York, New Haven, and H. R.R., 350 U.S. 155, 161 (1956), the Court
said: "As we noted earlier, respondent's amended complaint alleged violations of the Act. Whether
the Act was violated or whether, as respondent now claims, it was not, is, of course, a question
for the Board to determine. Even if petitioner's conduct is not prohibited by S 8 of the Act, it
may come within the protection of § 7, in which case the state was not free to enjoin the conduct."
'In Building Trades Council v. Kinard Constr. Co., 346 U.S. 933 (1954), the Court said:
"Since there has been no clear showing that respondent has applied to the National Labor Relations
Board for appropriate relief, or that it would be futile to do so, the Court does not pass upon the
question suggested by the opinion below of whether the state court could grant its own relief
should the Board decline to exercise its jurisdiction."
' See note 89 supra.
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dictional standards. 2 The Board felt that it had neither the time nor
resources to handle all the "little" employers. Some state courts felt that
since the Board refused to act, the states must, or the employer and
employees would have no forum."3 The states argued that if the business
of the employer was not large enough to fall within the jurisdictional
standards, it would be futile to apply to the Board, and the state could
therefore act. 4 On the other side, it was argued that since many of these
"little" employers were engaged in interstate commerce, 5 the pre-emp-
tion doctrine applied. If Congress intended the states to stay out, it made
no difference that the Board did not care to exercise its power.
In three cases decided in March of 1957,6 the United States Supreme
Court adopted this latter approach. The Court reasoned that Section 10(a)
of the Taft-Hartley Act97 was a declaration by Congress that the states
could only act when the Board had ceded jurisdiction to them. 8 It made
no difference that the Board refused to act, be it for budgetary or policy
reasons. Granting that a "no-man's land" now exists, the Court suggested
that either Congress could change the statute, the N.L.R.B. could reassert
its jurisdiction, or, the states could bring their labor statutes into con-
formity with the federal Act so that the Board could cede jurisdiction
under Section 10(a). The word "futile,"99 then, does not mean the Board's
refusal to act because of its jurisdictional standards.
While not the primary problem raised in these three cases, the Court,
in order to reverse the state courts, had to find that the activity com-
plained of was either prohibited or protected. In Guss v. Utah Labor
Relations Bd.,' the union alleged, after a consent election, that the
employer violated Sections 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of Taft-Hartley.'
The regional director dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. The state board
". 16 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 15 (1951); 1 CCH Lab. L. Rep., 1610 (4th ed. 1954). These
standards have been amended, and the current ones may be found in CCH Labor Law Reports,
No. 457 at 7.
'Cain, Grogden & Cain Inc. v. Local 47, Teamsters Union, 285 S.W.2d 942 (Texas 1956);
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 5 Utah 2d 68, 296 P.2d 733 (1956); San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 45 Cal.2d 657, 291 P.2d 1 (1955); Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchers
Workmen, Local 427, AFL v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 164 Ohio St. 285, 130 N.E.2d 237 (1955).
In these last three cases, the United States Supreme Court reversed the state decisions. See note 96
inlra.
" Ibid.
" For the full reach of the commerce power, see cases cited note 77 supra.
'
6 Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Amalgamated Meat Cutters and
Butcher Workmen, Local 427, AFL v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957); San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. S 160(a) (1952). This section grants the Board power to
prevent unfair labor practices and further provides that the Board is empowered to make agreements
with the states to cede jurisdiction when the state laws are comparable to the federal.
- To date, the Board has not yet made such an agreement since no state law parallels the
federal Act.
'See text circa note 90 supra.
1" See note 96 supra.
"61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(1), (3) and (5) (1952).
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found a violation. In Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workman,
Local 427, AFL v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc.,"0 2 the employer alleged that the
stranger union was picketing for recognition and an all union shop con-
tract, and was engaged in some secondary activity. The United States
Supreme Court stated that this activity violated Section 8(b) (2) of Taft-
Hartley."'3 In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, °4 the Court
found that the stranger union was picketing to obtain recognition and to
force the employer to sign an all union shop contract. This also was
prohibited by Section 8(b) (2). Therefore, the state courts must assume
that if the union asks for an all union shop contract, when the union
has not been voted the representative of a majority of the employees, the
federal Act prohibits the picketing and the state court is pre-empted.
These three decisions could leave open one further pre-emption ques-
tion regarding stranger picketing. In both the Meat Cutters and San
Diego cases, the Court said the union asked for an all union shop contract.
If the union had just asked for recognition, the United State Supreme
Court might not have found pre-emption. Except in cases where another
union has been certified, the Act does not prohibit picketing for recogni-
tion by a minority union.' °5
Whether the United States Supreme Court will go along with the
Board's view that recognition and organizational picketing by a stranger
union does not violate the Act and will also declare it not a protected
activity under Section 710. is, of course, an open question. If they do, we
would have a penumbra.' If they find it either prohibited or protected,
the state courts are pre-empted.
Other Pre-emption Arguments
The court has dismissed one argument used by state courts to find
no pre-emption. In Arkansas Oak Flooring Co. v. United Mine Work-
See note 96 supra.
"'61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(2) (1952).
"' See note 96 supra.
'61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(4)(C) (1952) forbids picketing to force "any
employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization as the representative of
his employees if another labor organization has been certified as the representative of such
employee .. " There is nothing else in the act to prohibit primary picketing for recognition. 61
STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(1) (1952) prohibits a union from restraining or coercing
employees in the exercise of the rights (to engage in, or refrain from, collective bargaining)
guaranteed in Section 7. But this has been construed as not forbidding peaceful organization or
recognition picketing. See United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 81 N.L.R.B. 802 (1940); Adminis-
trative Decision of the General Counsel, Case No. 1069, CCH Lab. L. Rep., 52,493 (4th ed.
1954). Therefore, it was demanding that the employer sign the all union shop contract which
violated S 8(b)(2), not the recognition picketing. Note the difference in the way the Kansas
District Courts handle the same problem, recognition picketing being held to violate KAN. G.S.
1949, 44-803, which corresponds to 5 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act.
"'See text circa note 58 supra.
o See text circa note 83 supra.
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ers,"'0 the Court held that peaceful picketing for recognition, when the
union represented a majority of the men, was a protected activity, and
the state could not enjoin it despite the fact that the union was not in
compliance with the non-communist affidavits requirements of Taft-
Hartley.'
Even when the employer does not go to the Board, but tries his luck
in the state court, the union may try to force the suit to the Board or into
federal court. In Capital Service v. N.L.R.B.," ° the Supreme Court held
that the Board could obtain an injunction in a federal court to prevent
the enforcement of a state court injunction when an unfair labor practice
was charged. The unions tried to obtain a federal court injunction di-
rectly, but were denied this right in Amalgamated Clothing Workers v.
Richman Brothers Co.,"' on the ground that a federal court was pro-
hibited from enjoining a state court by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1952).112 One possible way for a union to escape the Richman Brothers
case is to allege before the Board that the employer has committed an
unfair labor practice in going to the state court and seeking an injunc-
tion."' If the Board takes jurisdiction, it could then obtain an injunction
in a federal court prohibiting the state court to act.
In this hasty sketch of the pre-emption doctrine, many of the refine-
ments and possible arguments are left out. It seems clear from the vast
amount of litigation" 4 that many state courts are attempting to find
ways to assert their jurisdiction."' But, the United States Supreme Court
is attempting to protect federal uniformity. The answer is largely one of
policy as to the relative advantages of one uniform law and forum to
govern multiple state industries, and of each state being allowed to govern
the permissible limits of industrial conflict. Congress has the power to
decide the issue and should do So.
1351 U.S. 62 (1955).
'°961 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (1952).
10347 U.S. 501 (1954).
" 3 4 8 U.S. 511 (1955).
' This section prohibits federal injunctions against state courts except in certain specified cases.
But: see Retail Clerks Local 1564, AFL v.'Your Food Stores, 225 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1955),
where the court of appeals held that if the case were removed to the federal court and if it stayed
the state court on the grounds that the board had jurisdiction, res judicata would prevent the
employer from going back to the state court when the Board declined jurisdiction. It made nodifference that the federal court could not issue an injunction because of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. Perhaps other unions will attempt this method of circumventing a state court.
"61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §. 158(a)(5) (1952) requires bargaining in good faith.
Seeking an injunction might indicate a refusual to bargain.
'14 See the many recent cases cited in Smoot, Stranger Picketing: Permanent Injunction or
Permanent Litigation?, 42 A.B.A.J. 817 (1956).
' State Attorney Generals are pressing for federal legislation allowing more state action. See
Fatzer, More State Jurisdiction in Labor Disputes Recommended, 24 KAN. B.J. 223 (1956).
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CURRENT KANSAS STATUTORY LAW
The 1943 Labor-Management Relations Act
While the rest of the United States was evolving new legal approaches
to labor problems and despite the partial silence of our own state supreme
court, the Kansas Legislature passed new statutes regulating labor man-
agement relations. In 1943, it enacted a comprehensive labor code.11"
Much of this Act was copied from the federal Wagner Act. KAN. G.S.
1949, 44-803 guaranteed to employees the right to collective bargaining
and to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid and protection.
Employers were prevented from interfering with these rights in much
the same manner as were employers under Wagner."' However, the
Kansas Act went further. Kansas also made certain activities of unions
unlawful. Prohibitions ranged all the way from violence, to picketing
beyond the area of a labor dispute, and engaging in a strike without a
majority vote of the employees."' A close tab was kept on unions. They
had to file their constitutions and by-laws." 9 Their business agents had to
obtain licenses. 2° While the United States Congress vested the control
of labor relations in an administrative board,' 2' with the power to issue
cease and desist orders,'22 Kansas made the unlawful acts a crime."
In 1945, several national labor unions attacked this Act before a three-
judge federal district court. The State Attorney General defended. The
Kansas Federal District Court, in Stapleton v. Mitchell, 24 held Subsections
3, 12 and 13 of KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-809 unconstitutional and enjoined the
Attorney General and the state of Kansas from enforcing them. The court,
relying on the full reach of the free speech doctrine of Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, '2 stated that Kansas could not demand a strike vote, prevent
secondary picketing, or prevent a work stoppage because of a jurisdictional
dispute.
In 1950, the Kansas Supreme Court decided the one case that even
partly construed the Act. 25a In Radio Station KFH v. Musicians Ass'n,
Local 297, AFM," the plaintiff station sought an injunction. It claimed
.. KAN. G.S. 1949; 44-802 to 815.
ut Compare KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-808 with 49 STAT. 452 (1935) (later amended by 61 STAY.
140 (1947) ), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1952).
'
8 KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-809(3), (15) and (16). The Wagner Act made no provision for union
unfair labor practices.
KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-805.
' KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-804.
249 STAT. 453 (1935) (later amended by 61 STAY. 146 (1947)), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1952).
'n49 STAT. 453 (1935) (later amended by 61 STAT. 146 (1947)), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1952).
' KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-814.
"'60 F. Supp. 51 (1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 690 (1945).
"310 U.S. 88 (1940); see text circa note 60 supra.
" This is no longer true. See text circa note 138 infra.
' 169 Kan. 596, 220 P.2d 199 (1950).
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that the union had prevented a musical group from appearing on the sta-
tion and had thereby induced a breach of contract between the station and
the group. The group had played once on the plaintiff's station without
transferring in to the defendant's local, as required by the local's by-laws.
The union, as punishment, threatened to expel the group if they continued
to play. The court held that the local could invoke the union's by-laws and
discipline the group even if remote injury to the plaintiff resulted. The
court suggested that organization is a legitimate labor objective. It made
no difference that this objective had the effect of inducing breaches of
contract. While inducing a breach of contract is actionable, justification is
a defense. To enforce the rules of the union is not against public policy.
"The public interest in improving working conditions is of sufficient
social importance to justify such peaceful labor tactics. )12 7
The only section of the 1943 Labor-Management Relations Act... cited
by the court was the one requiring the business agent of the union to be
licensed. 29 The agent was in non-compliance when the suit commenced,
but apparently the court felt that it was sufficient if the union later com-
plied.'
The 1955 Amendments
With much publicity and bitterness, the state legislature in 1955
passed several amendments to the Act, adding or amending Sections 802,
808, 809a, 814, 816 and 817."' New definitions were formulated.' Em-
ployers were also prohibited from checking off union dues without em-
ployee authorization and from employing labor spies.' KAN. G.S. 1949,
44-809, aimed at unlawful union practices, was extensively amended."3 4
Subsections (3), (12) and (13), held unconstitutional in the Stapleton
case,13 5 were all revised. Subsection (3) now prohibits strikes without
a vote only in those cases where the employer was organized. Subsection
(12), prohibiting the refusal to work on or handle non-union goods,
and Subsection (13), prohibiting jurisdictional strikes, were abolished.
However, a new section, KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-809a, was copied, with
appropriate word changes, from Section 8(b)(4) of the Taft-Hartley
I"id. at 601, 220 P.2d at 204 (1950).
'See note 116 supra.
" See note 120 supra.
'°The dissent, by Harvey, C.J., stated that the union was acting unlawfully in conducting
business without compliance, citing KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-809(10).
'Governor Hall's veto of the "right to work" bill did not extend to these changes in the
Act. See Kan. Sess. Laws, c. 252 (1955).
"' KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-802.
"KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-808(5), (6).
' KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-809.
'See text circa note 123 supra.
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Act.136 The four parts of this section prohibit secondary boycotts and
jurisdictional strikes. So the substance of old Subsections (12) and (13)
of KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-809 are found in KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-809a."'
Two new Subsections were added to KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-809. Subsection
(15) made it unlawful for any person to violate the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement, while Subsection (16) outlawed the closed shop.
Finally, an amendment removed the section making violations of the
Act a crime and substituted injunctions to be brought by the county
attorney or any "aggrieved party."' 8
[As of October 5, 1957, the Kansas Supreme Court has interpreted
certain sections of this act. In Bender v. Constr. and Gen. Laborers, Local
685,138a the court, holding that the employer's business did not affect
interstate commerce, said that the Kansas Labor-Management Relations
Act prohibited "organizational picketing." The court cited language from
KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-803,1"8" KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-808(1)138c and
44-809(12),1 38" and KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-813 'e and said that it indicated a
legislative policy to protect the unorganized worker from coercion. The
court felt that a picket line, of necessity, pressured the employer into
coercing his employees to joining a union. However, the court denied the
argument made by the plaintiffs, the unorganized workers, that there
existed a constitutional "right-to-work" and based their decision on a
violation of legislative policy as expressed in the above statutes. 3 1]
'-61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(4) (1952).
' The district court injunction issued in the Stapleton case would no longer be valid, as
the re-enactment (44-809 into 44-809a) would be held constitutional by the United States Supreme
Court under current doctrine. See cases cited note 69 supra, and NLRB v. Denver Bldg. and
Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
'KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-814. KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-816 impowered the State Labor
Commissioner to establish rules and regulations for the various types of union elections demanded
by the Act. KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-817 provided for the appointment of mediators. The State
Labor Commissioner has established these rules and they are published in a pamphlet entitled
KANSAS LABOR LAWS (1955), which may be obtained from the State Labor Department, Topeka,
Kansas. This pamphlet also collects all of the laws applicable to labor relations. Due to lack of
appropriations from the State Legislature, the Commissioner has not been too active in conducting
elections. If a statutory scheme is established the Legislature should provide funds for carrying
out this scheme.
' See note 14a supra.
.Mb . . and such employee shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities."
"It shall be unlawful for any employer
(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 44-803 of the General Statutes of 1949.
re "It shall be unlawful for any persons
"(12) To coerce or intimidate any employee in the enjoyment of his legal rights, including
those guaranteed in section 44-803 of the General Statutes of 1949 .. ."
a "Except as specifically provided in this act, nothing therein shall be construed so as to
interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike or the right of individuals to
work; nor shall anything in this act be so construed as to invade unlawfully the right to freedom
of speech." (Emphasis added.)
"' The constitutionality (vis-a-vis free speech) of this legislative policy is discussed below.
See text circa note 176a infra.
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Effect upon the 1913 Anti-Injunction Act and the 1920 Court of
Industrial Relations Act
Although the 1943 Act and its amendments constitute a comprehen-
sive code of labor relations, the legislature did not repeal either the 1913
Anti-Injunction Act.. nor the 1920 Court of Industrial Relations Act. 4 '
The procedural aspects of the Anti-Injunction Act are apparently still
valid. While KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-418 provides for injunctions for
violations of the Act, nothing is said about the procedure in obtaining
these injunctions. Only the second part of the Anti-Injunction Act,14 '
prohibiting all injunctions in certain cases, would be overruled, by impli-
cation, in those cases where the new Act provides for an injunction.
The Court of Industrial Relations Act presents a different problem.
Although the United States Supreme Court held it unconstitutional as
violating the fourteenth amendment when regulating a packing plant,'42
the change in philosophy of that Court suggests that today the Act is
valid. 4 Certainly regulation of industry and labor in the public interest
is favored. State laws, if reasonable, are no longer declared contrary to the
fourteenth amendment.
The powers of the Industrial Court are now vested in the State Labor
Commissioner.' At the present time, the Commissioner is only applying
the 1920 Act to the mining industry. While KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-603 says
that the Court of Industrial Relations Act applies to the manufacture and
preparation of food and clothing, mining, public utilities and common
carriers, the Commissioner, in the pamphlet published by his office,' 45
omits all reference, in quoting KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-603, to the food and
clothing industries, public utilities and common carriers. The Commis-
sioner has orally stated that, it is questionable whether the State Labor
Commission or the State Corporation Commission has jurisdiction over
public utilities.' At this time, the Commissioner does not plan to attempt
to invoke the compulsory arbitration or'seizure sections of the Act in the
utility field.
'KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1104 to 1107.
'KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-601 to 628.
'UKAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1107.
"'5 See cases cited note 35 supra.
'Some fourteen states have such laws, ten of which were enacted after World War II. For
an analysis of these laws and arguments in favor of the validity of the Kansas Act, see Williams,
Settlement of Contract Negotiation Labor Disputes, 27 TEXAs L. REv. 587 (1949).
'KAN. G.S. 1949, 75-3402.
.. See note 138 supra.1
'Kan. Sess. Laws 1951, c. 306 repealed KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-602, 604 and 605. These sections
provided for rate-making power and specifically gave jurisdiction to the State Corporation Com-
mission over public utilities and common carriers. While Section 603 was not repealed, the repeal
of the other sections leaves the power of the Labor Commissioner in doubt.
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The Commissioner is also limited in applying the Court of Industrial
Relations Act in that the United States Supreme Court, in Bus Employees
v. WLRB,'47 held that the Wisconsin compulsory arbitration act was pre-
empted by Section 7 of Taft-Hartley. 4 ' The Court stated that the right
to strike for terms and conditions of employment was a "protected activ-
ity." Since all public utilities "affect" interstate commerce, 4 ' the states
are ousted from compulsory arbitration control of public utilities. Fur-
thermore, as most mining in this state is carried out in interstate com-
merce, the State Labor Commissioner would be pre-empted even there.
However, Congress may limit the reach of the federal act in the future,
and the Commissioner could then re-assert power.
The sections of the Court of Industrial Relations Act prohibiting
picketing and striking and providing penalties are probably repealed by
implication by the 1943 Kansas Labor-Management Relations Act. There-
fore, even though the former act is still in the statute book, it is not going
to have much practical effect on Kansas labor law.
The 1897 Anti-Monopoly Act
Mention should also be made of the Kansas Anti-Monopoly Act.'
This Act makes restraints on trade unlawful, and the definitions are
broad enough to include labor unions. Although the United States Su-
preme Court has taken unions out from under the Sherman Act, 5 ' there
can be no assumption that the Kansas Supreme Court will do likewise.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was used by the federal courts to protect
unions from the Sherman Act. Kansas still operates under a Clayton-
type restriction on injunctions. It has not adopted a little Norris-La-
Guardia Act. In fact, KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-814 states that persons
shall not be guilty of a criminal offense "except as otherwise provided
by law." This would seem to allow criminal prosecutions under the
Anti-Monopoly Act.
The Kansas Supreme Court and Pre-emption
Finally, the court's stand on pre-emption is of importance. As men-
tioned before,'52 at the time of writing, the Kansas Supreme Court had
decided four pre-emption cases in the last two years. In all four cases
the court found that the trial court was pre-empted. In none of the four
340 U.S. 383 (1951).
's See text circa note 58 supra.
'Bus Employees v. WLRB, 340 U.S. 383 (1951); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305
U.S. 197 (1938).
°KAN. G.S. 1949, 50-101 to 157.
'See cases cited note 62 supra.
"See note 6 supra.
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cases did the court discuss the possibility of the union activities falling
within the penumbra-being neither protected nor prohibited. To date,
the Kansas court is willing to say that in all cases of stranger picketing,
no matter what the immediate purpose of the union, the N.L.R.B. should
have jurisdiction in the first instance. In City Motors v. Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists, 5 3 the court refused to speculate on the power of the district
court to act when the Board refused jurisdiction on the ground that no
unfair labor practice was shown. Here, unless precluded in the future
by the United States Supreme Court, the Kansas court may be willing
to assume jurisdiction. None of these cases discussed the issue, now
answered by the United States Supreme Court,' of the right of the state
to act when the Board declined jurisdiction because of the failure to meet
jurisdictional standards.
[In the cases decided this October 5 and 9, the Kansas Supreme Court
reaffirmed the stand taken in the four earlier pre-emption cases. However,
in the new cases the court recognized the problem of the penumbra and
specifically followed the United States Supreme Court on the declining
jurisdiction problem. The court also discussed what activities of the union
are prohibited and therefore pre-empted from state court action.
In Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, Local 795, ,4a the trial
court had found the union guilty of engaging in a secondary boycott and
that the purpose of the picket line was to force the employer to bargain
as a representative of the employer's employees and to refuse to employ
non-union workers. The supreme court found that these activities
violated Sections 8(b)(4)(A),1 54' 7,14c and 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3)154 of
the Taft-Hartley Act.
In Friesen v. Gen. Team and Truck Drivers, Local 54,"4 the trial
court had found that the purpose of the union picket line was to force
other employers to refuse to do business with the plaintiff and that this
violated KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-809 and 44-809a. The supreme court
found that picketing for such a purpose was prohibited by Section (8) (b)-
(1) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 5 "f so that the state court was pre-empted.
Finally, in Stiben v. Constr. and Gen. Laborers, Local 685,54g
the court held that organizational picketing, in which the union also
' Ibid.
"'4 See text circa note 96 supra.
See note 14a supra.
r 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. S 158(b) (4) (A) (1952).
154C61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
1d 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1952); 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
158(a) (3) (1952).
'u" See note 14a supra.
r 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. S 158(b) (1) (A) (1952).
's See note 14a supra.
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attempted to force the employer to coerce his employees, violated KAN.
G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-808(1) and 44-809(12).154 But as this activity also
violated Section 8(b) (1) of the Taft-Hartley Act 54 and would force
the employer to violate 8(a)(1) of Taft-Hartley,54" the state court was
pre-empted." 4k
In all three of these cases, the plaintiff had argued that it would be
futile to apply to the National Labor Relations Board as the plaintiff's
business volume did not meet the Board's jurisdictional standards. Follow-
ing the dictates of the United States Supreme Court in the Guss case, 54'
the Kansas Supreme Court refused to allow the state trial court to exercise
jurisdiction.
The court raised two interesting problems in these cases. In the
Asphalt Paving case, the plaintiff argued that Section 14(b) of the Taft-
Hartley Act,"4m which allows states to control the execution and appli-
cation of union security contracts, should also allow the state to prohibit
activity which coerced the employer into executing such a contract. The
court rejected this argument, feeling constrained by several decisions of
the United States Supreme Court. 54" Justice Fatzer, in a concurring
opinion, pointed up the problem and suggested that the freedom allowed
the state by Section 14(b) should control over the pre-emption of state
laws demanded by 8(b) (2).*154
The Kansas Supreme Court also made some interesting observations
on who should determine whether the employer's business "affected"
interstate commerce. The court, in the Asphalt Paving case, held that the
trial court, after reviewing all the evidence, should determine, as a matter
of fact, whether this particular business affected interstate commerce.
They said that determining whether a business "affects" interstate com-
merce was not a question of law, and that if there was any evidence in
14 See notes 138c and 138d, respectfully, supra.
61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. S 158(b) (1) (1952).
61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. S 158(a) (1) (1952).
'k As discussed above, see text circa note 105 and note 105 supra, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board has not yet found that organizational or recognition picketing violates the federal Act.
Whether the United States Supreme Court will so find, or that such activity is prohibited, or
protected, is doubtful.
" Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957). See discussion under Jurisdictional
Standards and the "No-Man's Land," supra.
'"," 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. S 164(b) (1952).
'" The court cited Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen, Local 427, AFL v.
Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957); Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 429,
AFL v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., Inc., 353 U.S. 969 (1957); and Garner v. Teamsters Union,
Local 776, AFL, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). The Farnsworth case was a per curiam reversal of a
state court's attempt to prohibit picketing aimed at forcing illegal union security contracts. How-
ever, the United States Supreme Court has always talked in terms of a violation of Section 8 (b) (2)
of the Taft-Hartley Act, without discussing the apparent conflict between Section 14(b) and
Section 8(b) (2).
'"0 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. S 164(b) (1952); 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(2) (1952).
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the record to support the trial court's findings, the supreme court would
not reverse. 54"
However, in both the Stieben and the Friesen cases, the court reversed
the lower courts. In the Stieben case, the court used alternative grounds
for finding that the employer "affected" interstate commerce. The su-
preme court, unlike the trial court, found that the plaintiff's evidence
showed interstate activity and that the construction job was on a United
States Air Force Base. Thus, the court held that this was sufficient to
show "affecting" interstate commerce. In the Friesen case, the plaintiff,
a local warehouse, handled material shipped in interstate commerce. The
trial court denied the pre-emption argument, not on the basis that the
plaintiff did not "affect" interstate commerce, but because it did not fall
within the National Labor Relation Board's jurisdictional standards. The
supreme court reversed because jurisdictional standards are immaterial
to pre-emption.]
CURRENT UNION ACTIVITY AND THE LEGAL CONTROL THEREOF
Before discussing the views of the Kansas District Courts in labor
cases, some of the current labor union tactics and how a few of the other
state supreme courts have handled them should be mentioned. This
further background is presented so that the Kansas lawyer may compare
the approaches of the Kansas District Courts with those of other states.
Stranger Picketing
Most injunction cases decided by Kansas District Courts are predicated
upon what is known as stranger picketing. "' In the typical situation,
you have an unorganized shop or construction job, and union officials,
seeking to organize the employees, throw up a picket line composed of
non-employees of that particular employer. If union men supply the
employer or if the other workers on the construction job are union mem-
bers, they will not cross the picket line, and the employer is forced to
close down. This puts economic pressure on both the employer and his
unorganized employees.
Courts reason that picketing is a means of achieving certain ends.
While a few courts seemingly find that stranger picketing is per se an
unlawful means, most courts look to the purpose of the picketing and
' The Kansas Supreme Court apparently rejected the argument that the factual relation of
the employer to interstate commerce is a question of fact, but that the issue of whether this
factual relationship falls within the definition of "affects" is a question of interpretation of federal
law to be determined by the United States Supreme Court.
"' Stranger picketing exists when a union sets up a. picket line around a non-union employer.
None of the members of the union or picket line are employees. It is picketing without a strike.
[Vol. 6
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then decide whether picketing, as a means of achieving this particular
purpose, is unlawful.
In handling this problem, state courts have categorized stranger
picketing into several classifications, according to the immediate purpose
or tactics of the stranger union. These are: (1) advertising to the public
that the employer is non-union; (2) attempting to organize the employees
by trying to show them that the union is powerful and that it would be
intelligent to join; (3) demanding that the employer grant the union
the right, by signing a contract with them, to represent his employees in
collective bargaining-so-called recognition picketing; (4) demanding
that the employer induce or coerce his unorganized employees to join
the union; and (5) demanding that the employer not only make the
union the bargaining agent, but also sign a contract containing an all
union shop provision. Tactics (3), (4) and (5) are frequently found in
various combinations, depending on the evidence presented to the court.
Though the immediate purpose may vary, the ultimate aim of all of these
tactics is to increase the size and power of the union.
Usually, the employer seeks the injunctive aid of the court to assist
him in his economic fight with a union. He could seek damages or, if a
criminal statute was violated, ask for the aid of the county attorney. But,
to protect his business, an injunction is the most effective. To obtain this
injunction, the employer must meet the usual equitable requirements. He
must show that he has suffered irreparable injury, that the union's activity
is "unlawful," and that he has no adequate remedy at law.
Unlawfulness is a vague and confusing requirement. At some time
or another, courts have held almost every activity of a labor union unlaw-
ful. In the beginning, courts would find unlawful the intentional inflic-
tion of economic damages. Later, they talked in terms of the privilege
to inflict these injuries, if the activities of the union were justified.
Justification existed if the union was engaged in economic competition,
attempting to gain an economic benefit for its members.'56 With the
passage of labor legislation in the 1930's and 1940's, the courts looked to
the legislature to define the state's policy of justification, and therefore
lawfulness.
In the area of stranger picketing, the legislatures gave seemingly
contradictory instructions. Most state acts, following the Wagner Act,
stated that collective bargaining was favored; that employees were to
have the right of concerted action, including the right to strike; and
' In Radio State KFH v. Musicians Union, Local 297, AFM, 169 Kan. 596, 220 P.2d 199
(1950), the court talked in these terms.
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that employers were not to interfere.' 57 On the other side, employees
were given the right to refrain from collective action and specific union
practices were prohibited. 5 But organizing the unorganized was not
specifically prohibited and would carry out the policy of the state. It was
to be encouraged. Some courts so held, and allowed stranger picketing.5 9
The United States Supreme Court at first limited the right of the
states to stop organizational picketing, as the union could claim first
amendment protections.' However, the Supreme Court later relaxed
this prohibition, and said that, within reasonable limits, a state court
could prevent stranger picketing found to be contrary to the state's public
policy.' With this new freedom, many state courts found stranger
picketing to be violating public policy. 2
The Vogt Case
This past June the United States Supreme Court finally completed
the circle. In Teamsters Union-, Local 695, AFL v. Vogt, Inc.,' a five-jus-
tice majority held that a state could look beyond the immediate purpose of
the union in picketing (stipulated here to be organizational), and find
that the actual effect, and presumably therefore the actual purpose, was
to coerce the employer into forcing the employees to join the union. The
Supreme Court had previously held that a state, without violating the
union's constitutional rights, could find unlawful the union's coercion of
an employer to coerce his employees. 4 But it was a big and important
step to hold that a state could find, with only direct evidence of intention
to organize, that the purpose of the union was to coerce the employer to
coerce his employees.
In effect, the Vogt case now allows a state court, if its makes a proper
factual finding, to hold organizational picketing unlawful.6 5 No longer
"TSee, e.g., KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-803, 808 and 813.
' See, e.g., KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-803, 809 and KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-809a.
'See, e.g., C. S. Smith Metropolitan Market Co. v. Lyons, 16 Cal.2d 389, 106 P.2d 414(1940); Peters v. Central Labor Council, 179 Ore. 1, 169 P.2d 870 (1946). But see Gilbertson v.
Culinary Workers, note 161 inlra, for a discussion of the legislative change in policy. Contra, Simon
v. Schwachman, 301 Mass. 573, 18 N.E.2d 1 (1938).
'WIn American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941), the Court said that a
state could not draw unreasonable lines around what was a labor dispute and reversed a state
court injunction prohibiting stranger picketing.
10, See cases cited note 69 supra.
102 See, e.g., Audubon Homes, Inc. v. Spokane Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 298 P.2d
1112 (Wash. 1956); Gilbertson v. Culinary Workers, 204 Ore. 326, 282 P.2d 632 (1955); Morgan
Mill Work Co. v. Highway Truck Drivers, 115 A.2d 709 (Del. 1955).
'°'352 U.S. 817 (1957); see text circa note 71 supra.
' Bldg. Service Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
''In the Vogt case, the Court also discusses Pappas v. Stacey, 151 Me. 36, 116 A.2d 497
(1955), the appeal of which it had dismissed for lack of a substantial federal question. Pappas v.
Stacey, 350 U.S. 870 (1955). The Supreme Court, quoting the state supreme court's words, said
that Maine could constitutionally find that organizational picketing would place a "steady and
exacting pressure upon the employer to interfere with the free choice of the employees in the
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need the employer testify that the union organizer demanded that he tell
his employees to join the union. While American Federation of Labor v.
Swing,166 which held that stranger organizational picketing was an
exercise of free speech, was not overruled, it is indistinguishable on the
facts. The Court, speaking through Justice Frankfurter, says of the earlier
cases: "It is not too surprising that examination of these adjudications
should disclose an evolving, not a static, course of decision. '"167
The Court specifically leaves two constitutional limitations on the
states. A statute, a la Thornhill, which prohibits all picketing, and a
blanket injunction prohibiting all picketing, would be invalid. The
statute and the injunction must be limited to preventing unlawful pur-
poses. However, as the dissent points out, these limitations are extremely
weak if the state court is careful in finding its facts.
There are no state decisions since the Vogt case. How far states will
carry their new freedom is problematical. As a matter of policy, states
may and need not limit picketing up to the constitutional line.
Prior to the Vogt, case, however, many state courts had expressed
policies as to the extent of allowable union picketing. While some of
these decisions may be the result of felt constitutional compulsion, many
were merely an indication of a state policy in this conflicting area.
Besides Maine and Wisconsin, Washington also found that organiza-
tional picketing necessarily results in coercion of the employer."' Oregon
said that their labor relations statute prohibited a union from coercing or
influencing employees to join. 69
Some states have apparently reverted to the old idea that stranger
picketing is wrongful per se. The purpose is immaterial." '  These
states outlawed stranger picketing by defining a "labor dispute" as a
dispute between an employer and a majority of his employees, and by
forbidding picketing if there were no "labor dispute." However, a lower
Arizona court1 ' held, as did the Oregon Supreme Court,'72 that a statute
outlawing all picketing by a non-majority union was unconstitutional,
matter of organization. To say that picketing is not designed to bring about such action is to
forget an obvious purpose of the picketing-to cause economic loss to the business during non-
compliance by the employees with the requests of the union." 77 Sup. Ct. at 1171.
°312 U.S. 321 (1941); see note 61 supra.
" 77 Sup. Ct. at 1168.
'Audubon Homes, Inc. v. Spokane Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 298 P.2d 1112
(Wash. 1956).
"OGilbertson v. Culinary Workers, 204 Ore. 326, 282 P.2d 632 (1955). However, the court
held unconstitutional a section of the Oregon act outlawing all picketing by a non-majority union.
'o This is the apparent holding of Arkansas Oak Flooring Co. v. United Mine Workers, 227
La. 1109, 81 S.2d 413 (1955) rev'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 62 (1956). And see Morgan Mill
Work Co. v. Highway Truck Drivers, 115 A.2d 709 (Del. 1955).
"71Shamrock Dairy, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, Local 310, AFL, 28 CCH Lab. Cas. 69,480
(Ariz. 1955).
' See note 169 supra.
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as it violated the "stranger organizational picketing-free speech rule"
of the Swing case."' But the Vogt case may now give these states a
freedom to act.
A few states have made a distinction between organizational and
advertising picketing on the one hand, and picketing aimed at recogni-
tion or coercion of the employer to coerce his employees on the other.
Only the latter has been held unlawful.174 Indiana recently said that
organizational picketing was proper, but the stranger union must com-
municate its demand to the employees. It must ask them to join. Mere
silent organizational picketing is unlawful. 7 ' California has apparently
gone all the way and found that stranger picketing aimed at recognition
or coercion of the employer is lawful.17
As there is no uniformity among the other states as to how far a union
may go, Kansas is free to choose whatever policy it desires. The legislature
has spoken about elections and recognition, but the Labor-Management
Relations Act is silent about advertising or narrow organizational
picketing.
[The October 5 case of Bender v. Constr. and Gen. Laborers, Local
685 76" is almost identical to both the Wisconsin Vogt case...b and the
Maine case of Pappas v. Stacey. 7 "e In all three cases, the state courts found
organizational picketing, and that this violated state labor policy. The
United States Supreme Court, in the Vogt case, noted that the Wisconsin
and Maine courts both found, as did the Kansas court, that this type of
organizational picketing would of necessity place pressure on the em-
ployer to coerce his employees. Perhaps it is this latter "purpose" that a
state may find unlawful without violation the fourteenth amendment-
free speech protection.
In any event, the Kansas Supreme Court has spoken, and the trial
courts may now find organizational picketing unlawful. Let us now turn
to the Kansas district courts and see how they construed the state labor
act prior to the October 5 decisions of the Kansas Supreme Court.]
1 See note 166 supra.
174 Simmons v. Retail Clerks, 5 ll.2d 429, 125 N.E.2d 700 (1955); Wood v. O'Grady, 307 N.Y.
532, 122 N.E.2d 386 (1954); Lee Mark Metal Mfg. Co. v. Teamsters Union, Local 596, AFL,
30 CCH Lab. Cas. 69,968 (Pa. 1956).
"5 Teamsters Union, Local 135, AFL v. Merchandise Warehouse, 132 N.E.2d 715 (Ind. 1956).
76 C. S. Smith Metropolitan Market Co. v. Lyons, 16 Cal.2d 389, 106 P.2d 414 (1940).
But see Plant, Recognitional Picketing by Minority Unions in California, 9 STAN. L. REV. 100
(1956), who argues that some forms of recognitional picketing would now be held to be unlawful.
'70 See note 14a supra.
"7b Teamsters Union, Local 695, AFL v. Vogt, Inc., 270 Wis. 315, 74 N.W.2d 749 (1956),
affirmed on appeal, 352 U.S. 817 (1957).
" Pappas v. Stacey, 151 Me. 36, 116 A.2d 497 (1955), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 817 (1955).
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CURRENT VIEWS OF THE KANSAS DISTRICT COURTS
Information was obtained on some twenty-six labor cases."' In many
of these, the exact holding of the court and the reasons therefor were
not available.' 78 No attempt was made to evaluate the correctness of the
decision. Reference should be made to the opinions of other states courts,
to those of the United States Supreme Court, and particularly to the
latest Kansas opinions handed down this month.
Stranger Picketing Cases
Of the twenty-six cases, eighteen involved stranger picketing.' Six-
teen of these were suits by the employer against the union. Two suits were
brought by the employees of the picketed employer.
In three of the stranger picketing cases, the district court found that
the employer was engaged in interstate commerce and the district court
thereby pre-empted. In one of these, the court issued an ex parte restrain-
ing order pending the determination of the pre-emption issue, while in
the other two, the court refused even this. In all three cases, the court
found pre-emption after the Kansas Supreme Court's first pre-emption
decision in Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 576 v. Johnson.8 ' These
district courts felt that it was for the N.L.R.B., in the first instance, to
determine whether the union activity was an unfair labor practice. In one
case, the court said the fact that the Board would not take jurisdiction
because plaintiff did not meet the Board's jurisdiction standards was
immaterial. The state court still did not have jurisdiction. In another,
the court felt it was for the Board in the first instance, and it made no
difference that the regional counsel of the Board had dismissed on the
merits. The employer still could have appealed to the chief counsel.
In the other fifteen cases involving stranger picketing, the court either
found that it was not pre-empted or ignored the problem, or there was
insufficient information on which to base a conclusion as to the court's
position on pre-emption. In the cases where the issue was discussed, three
courts found that the employer was engaged in intrastate commerce,
so the federal Act did -not apply. In two of the cases, the court felt that
while the employer was in interstate commerce, his volume of business
"n A list of the case appears in the Appendix.l7hIn the following discussion all statements are, it is hoped, reasonably correct. Unless the
courts' views were fairly well indicated, the case was classified as "no information." In a few
cases, inferences were drawn where reasonably justified. In some cases the actual holding of the
court was given even if the court did not use the same language. In all of the cases where
the pleadings and memorandum opinion of the district court were not available, the validity of
the report cannot be vouched for.
' See text circa note 155 supra.
'o See note 6 supra.
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was not sufficiently large to meet the Board's jurisdictional standards.
In one case, the court indicated its belief that a restraining order could
issue, pending the Board's determination of the issue. One judge, in two
cases before him, felt that organizational picketing, aimed at destroying
a constitutional "right to work," was neither prohibited nor protected
by Taft-Hartley. Therefore, a state court could act. In two cases, the court
found the employer in interstate commerce, but said that the state court
could still act. Neither district court gave a reason, but apparently felt
that stranger picketing aimed at recognition was neither prohibited nor
protected, and therefore, perhaps, came within the penumbra. 8' In one
other case, on which there is rather extensive information, the court
seemed to ignore the pre-emption problem. Apparently it was not even
raised. Finally, there was not enough information in four cases to dis-
cover the court's view on pre-emption.
As stated earlier, the Kansas Supreme Court has heard four pre-
emption cases,' 82 and has sustained the trial court on the pre-emption
issue in one case and reversed it in three others. Of the other twelve cases
where pre-emption was not found, five were decided prior to the Kansas
Supreme Court's decisions on pre-emption. Seven of the cases, however,
were decided after the first Kansas pre-emption case. In two of these
seven cases, the court said that pre-emption did not apply when constitu-
tional rights were involved. In one, the court found no pre-emption
when the employer did not meet the Board's jurisdictional standards.
Information is lacking as to the reasoning of the district courts in the
other four cases.
[Of the four cases decided on October 5 and 9, the trial court was
reversed in two and sustained in one of the above pre-emption cases. a
In the one case where the trial court was sustained and in one of the cases
where the trial court was reversed, the supreme court refused to follow
the trial court's reasoning that pre-emption does not exist when constitu-
tional rights are involved. Rather, the supreme court sustained or reversed
on the grounds of the factual finding of "affecting" interstate commerce.
In the other case, the court reversed the trial court on the ground that
the jurisdictional standards of the National Labor Relations Board were
immaterial in determining pre-emption.]
In the fifteen cases that the district courts decided on their merits,
not finding pre-emption, they found a variety of unlawful purposes.
,B' See text circa note 83 supra.
"n' See text circa note 152 and note 6 supra.
"' In the fourth case the court sustained the trial court's finding that it was pre-empted.
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Frequently the court found more than one unlawful purpose in a single
case. From the information available, it is sometimes difficult to discover
just what the court felt the purpose to be, but the findings appear as
follows.
There were three cases of purely organizational picketing. No demand
was made on the employer. In two cases, the employer alleged that the
union was asking for recognition without representing a majority of
the employees. The court issued the restraining order, but there is no
information on what it found unlawful. One court issued a restraining
order to preserve the status quo when the union picketed for both
organizational and recognition purposes. The court did not find the
picketing unlawful, but merely restrained the union pending N.L.R.B.
action. In two other cases, the court found that the union engaged in
both recognition and organizational picketing, and issued an injunction.
But there is no information on why the court felt that the picketing was
unlawful.
In four cases, the court found recognition picketing unlawful. In one
of these four, the court also found the union unlawfully coercing the
employer to coerce his employees to join the union. In the other three, the
court found that the union unlawfully demanded that the employer sign
an all union shop contract. 8 ' In two of these three cases, the court also
found unlawful picketing aimed at organizing the shop.
In the remaining three cases, the court found unlawful, in two of
them, the demand that the employer sign an all union shop contract.
In the other case, the court found that the union's demand that the
employer quit working at the same jobs as his employees, and that the
employer coerce his employees into joining the union, were both unlaw-
ful. In one of these cases, the court indicated that if the union had only
engaged in organizational picketing, no injunction would have issued.
What reasons did the courts assign for finding these purposes unlaw-
ful in these fifteen cases ? When the court found that the union was merely
attempting to organize, it stated, in two of the cases, that this was un-
lawful because it violated a constitutional "right to work" and because it
was picketing beyond the area of a "labor dispute" in violation of KAN.
G.S. 1955 Supp. 44-809(13). In the other organizational picketing case,
the court did not cite the Kansas act, but stated that such picketing was
against public policy and was a "secondary boycott."'8 4
' The employer's signing such a contract would have the effect of coercing the employees to
join the union. However, in these three cases, the court did not make a separate finding that the
union coerced the employer to coerce his employees.
I5 Apparently the court characterized the picketing as a secondary boycott because the union
truck drivers refused to cross the picket line and deliver supplies.
For a discussion of how the Kansas Supreme Court handled organizational picketing in the
Bender case, see text circa note 138a supra.
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In seven of the fifteen cases, the court talked in terms of a violation
of KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-803. This section not only gives employees the
right to bargain collectively, but also gives them the right to refrain
from collective bargaining. In all four of the recognition cases, the court
used this section to find the picketing unlawful. In two of the cases, the
court said that demanding recognition also violated KAN. G.S. 1949,
44-808(1)1 " and KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-809(14).18 In the third recognition
case the court cites only KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-803 and 44-809(14).187 In the
other recognition case, the court cites KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-803 and 44-809,
without referring to any subsection.
In five of the cases, the court talked about an all union shop clause in
the demanded contract. In only one of the cases did the court clearly
find that such a clause was demanded. In that case, the court cited KAN.
G.S. 1949, 44-803 and 44-809 and said that without an election as provided
by statute, such a demand is unlawful.'88 The court also found that the
picketing was a public and private nuisance, but the all union shop
contract is the only unlawful activity discussed by the court. In two of
the five cases, the all union shop clause existed, but specifically stated
that it was not to be effective until voted upon by the employees. The
court is not clear on whether a non-effective all union shop clause is an
independent violation. The language of the memorandum opinion leaves
the impression that the court felt the clause to be unlawful, but it cited
no reason. In the fourth case, the court merely said, without citing the
statute, that an all union contract is bad and against the public policy of
Kansas.'89 In the fifth case, the court stated that there was no evidence
of the terms of the contract, but warned that the necessary effect of the
demand for union recognition is to impose an all union shop, which is
unlawful.
None of the courts found that the only unlawful purpose of the picket-
ing was to coerce the employer to coerce the employees, but two courts
found this one of several violations. One court cited KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-
803 as authority and held that it was wrongful for a union to force the
employer to violate employee rights. In the other case, the court cited
"s This subsection prohibits an employer from coercing his employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by 44-803.IMThis subsection is now KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-809(12) and provides that no person shall
coerce any employee in the enjoyment of rights under 44-803.
2
m Now KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-809(12).
' The court must be referring to KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-809(4) which prohibits an all
union shop without a majority vote.
' It is not clear, in this fourth case, whether the court found this demand to be an independent
violation, as it also discussed organizational picketing and said that the union violated KAN. G.S.
1949, 44-803.
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KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-803 and also KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-809(4), pre-
sumably on the theory that employer coercion was not allowed without
an election.
In one case, the court found unlawful picketing against a one-man
shop, and said that this was against public policy. In another case, the
court issued a restraining order pending N.L.R.B. action on the theory
that it could preserve the status quo without making a finding of unlaw-
ful activity.
Cases Not Involving Stranger Picketing
There are eight injunction cases that apparently do not involve stranger
picketing. In two cases, the union was the plaintiff. In one of these, the
union had previously asked for and received an injunction prohibiting the
employer from coercing his employees in their right to engage in col-
lective bargaining. The union claimed that the employer ignored the
injunction and sought a contempt citation. From the information avail-
able, the union apparently dismissed its petition and therefore contempt
proceedings did not ensue. The pre-emption issue was not raised. In the
other case, the court dismissed the injunction suit brought by the union
on the ground that the case was then pending before the N.L.R.B. on a
charge of an unfair labor practice by the employer. The district court felt
it was pre-empted.
An employer obtained an injunction in one case on the ground that
the union was picketing beyond the area of a labor dispute. The union,
representing the truck drivers of a trucking company, picketed a flour
mill as part of a strike against the trucking company. Although the
flour mill company had the same board of directors as the trucking
company and even though the trucking company carried all of the flour
mill's products, the court found that the two companies were separate.
The court felt than KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-809(15)' ° prohibited this type of
picketing. No mention is made by the court of the pre-emption problem.
In the fourth case of those not involving stranger picketing, an
employer obtained an injunction against a majority union, which was
striking to enforce demands in a new contract, on the grounds that some
of the union members engaged in violence, used insulting language and
conducted mass picketing. The court did not discuss pre-emption in its
journal entry, nor did it cite any Kansas statutes. But the court did find
the activity unlawful and issued a temporary injunction. However, the
'°Now KAN. G.S. 1955 Supp., 44-809(13).
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court allowed peaceful picketing by a small number of men at the gates
of the plant." 1
In the other four cases, information as to the facts and holdings is
lacking. These cases might be classified as stranger picketing ones, but
even though the union was made the defendant and non-employees were
picketing in some instances, it appears that the union actually represented
a majority of the employees.
In one case, it appears that the union obtained a majority of the
truck drivers of a food processing company. When the employer refused
to recognize the union, it struck and picketed the food processing plant.
The court issued a restraining order against the picketing, but this was
later dismissed on the ground that the employer had recognized the union.
The reasons for granting the order are not given, nor is pre-emption
discussed.
In another case, the union struck, picketed the employer, and "per-
suaded" other union men not to handle the goods of the employer. It
appears that the court enjoined the union from invoking the "hot cargo"
clause of its contract and from any secondary picketing. But no reasons
are given and nothing is said about pre-emption.
In the last two cases, the union apparently had a majority of the
employees and when the employer refused to recognize it, the men
struck and picketed the employer. The union also picketed the stores
that sold the employer's product. In one case, the court found the plain-
tiff operating in interstate commerce and, after issuing a restraining
order, denied a temporary injunction on the grounds that the N.L.R.B.
had jurisdiction. In this case, decided prior to the Kansas Supreme Court
decisions on pre-emption, the court said that part of the Court of In-
dustrial Relations Act, KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-603 to 44-617, was in conflict
with KAN. G.S. 1949, 44-803 and the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts.
Therefore the settlement of this dispute was for the proper administra-
tive agency. However, the court did order the union to remove a false
statement from the picket signs and apparently said, as dicta and without
any reasons, that product picketing was not unlawful. In the other case,
the court felt that such product picketing was unlawful, but there is no
information as to why this was so. The pre-emption issue was raised, but
the court stated that the employer was in intrastate commerce even
though it purchased goods from outside the state. Therefore the district
'9' In only two other cases did the employer allege violence, but the courts found none in
these or in any other cases. Apparently, most locals are shying away from such behavior. There
is a suggestion in one case, brought by a union, that the employer used violence to prevent the
employees from organizing, but it is not clear that the court so found.
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court had jurisdiction. The court did refuse to enjoin the distribution of
union literature concerning the labor dispute, but enjoined all picketing.
General Observations on District Court Cases
Some general observations about the twenty-six cases are possible. In
only one case did the district court mention the Anti-Injunction statute.'
Citing Bull v. Int'l Alliance,'9 3 the district court held here that no "labor
dispute" existed in a stranger picketing situation. Therefore, the statutes
did not apply and the court was free to issue the injunction under ordinary
equity procedure. In three of the cases, the temporary restraining order
was issued for seven days or less, indicating perhaps that KAN. G.S. 1949,
60-1104 was followed." 4 In at least seven cases, the employer was required
to give a bond, perhaps indicating compliance with KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-
1105.' In many of the cases there is no information as to the pleadings;
thus it is not known whether or not the court required a bond. However,
in several cases about which there is information, the Anti-Injunction
statute was ignored, even though the defendant union cited it in their
answers.
The free speech problem was raised in only three cases, which were
all decided by one judge. In one case, the court concluded that the state
had a right to set a limit on the right of free speech, citing Local Union
of Journeyman Plumber and Steamfitters v. Graham.' In the others, the
court merely said that the injunction did not violate the right of free
speech.
One of the problems faced by the United States Congress before
passing the Norris-LaGuardia Act was that of the delay inherent in in-
junction cases. An ex parte restraining order, frequently issued on affi-
davits without notice, works a hardship on the defendant. To meet this
problem, the Kansas labor code limits an ex parte restraining order to
a duration of seven days. 97 The Norris-LaGuardia Act limits such an
order to five days.'98 How have our district courts handled this problem?
In the four cases where information is available, the court issued a
temporary injunction upon a hearing some three, nine, eleven and fifteen
'
2 KAN. G.S. 1949, 60-1104 to 1107.
' 119 Kan. 713, 241 Pac. 459 (1925); see text circa note 46 supra.
' This statute provides that temporary restraining orders must expire within seven days from
date issued, unless extended for good cause.
'This statute requires one obtaining a restraining order or injunction to post bond.
In one case, after the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the trial court on the pre-emption issue,
the union sought to collect on the bond. The trial court allowed the suit and was sustained by the
Supreme Court. See Texas Constr. Co. v. H. & P. E. Local 101, 180 Kan. 393, 304 P.2d 521 (1956).
'345 U.S. 192 (1953).
KAt. G.S. 1949, 60-1104.
'47 STAT. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1952).
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days after the restraining order. In one case, a hearing was held three
days after the restraining order issued, but 128 days elapsed until the
restraining order was dismissed and a temporary injunction denied, ex-
cept as to some false statements on a placard. One court denied an ex
parte petition for a restraining order, but issued a temporary injunction
the next day. In four other cases, a restraining order was issued for four
days (dissolved upon a subsequent hearing) five days, thirty-nine days,
and two years and ten months. In all these cases, no temporary injunction
was ever issued. In three other cases a restraining order was issued, but
there is no information on their time limits or whether a temporary or
permanent injunction was issued.
In eight cases a permanent injunction was issued. In two of these, no
temporary injunctions were issued, and forty-six days and forty-eight
days elapsed from the dates of the restraining orders to the dates of the
permanent injunctions. In the two having temporary injunctions, forty
and fifty-three days elapsed from the dates of the restraining orders. Four
cases lack information regarding restraining orders, but twenty-eight,
forty-four, 151 and 163 days elapsed from the dates of temporary injunc-
tions to the dates of the permanent ones.
This lack of prosecution, to at least the temporary injunction stage,
works a hardship on the union because in Kansas a restraining order is
not a final order, and therefore is not appealable.' 99 If the district court
does not set a time limit on the restraining order or dismiss it for lack
of prosecution, the employer, particularly in the construction industry,
may complete the job free from picketing and thus never prosecute the
case to a conclusion on its merits. If picketing is ever proper, the merits
of the injunction should be heard as soon as possible.
Conclusion
In general, these opinions leave the impression that the District Courts
of Kansas feel that the Kansas Labor-Management Relations Act declares
the policy for the state. That policy is that picketing is not a proper
weapon for unions to use in organizational drives. It is economic coercion,
and coercion is not favored. Some court might allow a union to picket
if the union stated that it was engaged in picketing for organizational
and advertising purposes only, but the union could make no demands on
the employer. But most courts would not even sanction this type of
'The United States Supreme Court has held that a temporary injunction is not a final order.
In effect, this means that if the state supreme court decides the case upon an appeal from a
temporary injunction, there is no appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Montgomery Building
and Constr. Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co. Inc., 344 U.S. 178 (1952).
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picketing. They feel that personal conversation and the circulation of
union literature are the only proper ways to increase union membership.
Even though the Kansas labor laws provide for unionization and collec-
tive bargaining, the district courts do not feel that they should aid this
policy by allowing economic pressure. The counter policy of freedom
to choose prevails.
The pre-emption question is still open in Kansas. Most of the district
court opinions finding no pre-emption were handed down prior to the
decisions of the Kansas Supreme Court. A few courts still seem to ignore
these decisions, but with their increased publicity, plus knowledge of
this month's supreme court decisions, the district courts will undoubtedly
find that they are pre-empted. Of course, there are still some unanswered
questions even for those industries in interstate commerce. When the
industries are in intrastate commerce, the Kansas courts must decide
the issue.
[The four cases decided by the Kansas Supreme Court on October
5 and 9, 1957, apparently confirm the above views. Certainly the supreme
court feels that when the employer is in, or affects, interstate commerce,
the state courts are pre-empted. And surely the district courts will follow
this lead.
The one case decided on the merits" " leaves the impression that the
Kansas Supreme Court agrees with the majority of trial courts in holding
that stranger picketing is unlawful. Only the intricacies of "unlawful
purpose" must be defined by later cases. 199b]
"' Bender v. Constr. and Gen. Laborers, Local 685.
'b Three other cases are now on appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court. One, Hyde Park
Dairies, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, Local 795, No. 40,543, has been argued, but the supreme court
has not yet released its opinion. Newell d/b/a El Dorado Dairy v. Teamsters Union, Local 795,
No. 40,486 and Coleman Co., Inc. v. Int'l Union, UAW, No. 40,631 appear on this October's
docket. Perhaps some of the remaining questions will be answered this winter.
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1. AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS & BUTCHER WORKMEN, LOCAL 576 v. JOHNSON
Shawnee County Dist. Court, Dist. 3; J. Johnson.
2. ASPHALT PAVING, INC. V. TEAMSTERS UNION, LOCAL 795
Sedgwick County Dist. Court, Dist. 18, Case No. A-57194; J. Sattgast.
3. ATKINSON V. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINTERS, LOCAL 1587
Reno County Dist. Court, Dist. 40, Case No. 7840; J. Fontron.
4. BINDER V. CONSTR. & GEN. LABORERS UNION, LOCAL 685
Saline County Dist. Court, Dist. 30, Case No. 21072; J. Buzick.
5. COLEMAN COMPANY, INC. V. U.A.W., LOCAL 570
Sedgwick County Dist. Court, Dist. 18 (Div. 1), Case No. A-65666; J. Kandt.
6. CITY MOTORS V. I.A.M., LOCAL 778, AFL
Wyandotte County Dist. Court, Dist. 29 (Div. 4), Case No. 92810-A;
J. McHale.
7. DAVIDSON BROTHERS MOTOR CO. V. I.A.M., LOCAL 778
Wyandotte County Dist. Court, Dist. 29 (Div. 3), Case No. 92665-A; J.
Miller.
8. FRIESEN V. GEN. TEAM & TRUCK DRIVERS, LOCAL 54
Reno County Dist. Court, Dist. 40, Case No. 8864; J. Fontron.
9. HARRY BANKER d/b/a HARRY BANKER EXCAVATING CONTRACTOR V. BLDG. &
CONSTR. TRADES COUNCIL OF SALINA
Saline County Dist. Court, Dist. 30, Case No. 19631; J. Buzick.
10. HOEHN CHEVROLET, INC. V. I.A.M., LOCAL 778
Johnson County Dist. Court, Dist. 10 (Div. 2); J. Brenner.
11. HYDE PARK DAIRIES, INC. V. TEAMSTERS UNION, LOCAL 795
Sedgwick County Dist. Court, Dist. 18 (Div. 2), Case No. A-60176; J. Kline.
12. JOHNSON V. SHEETMETAL WORKERS, LOCAL 29
Reno County Dist. Court, Dist. 40, Case No. 7143; J. Fontron.
13. KAw PAVING Co. V. INT'L UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS
Douglas County Dist. Court, Dist. 41; J. Coffman.
14. KILLOUGH CONSTR. Co. V. COWE
Douglas County Dist. Court, Dist. 41, Case No. 20111; J. Coffman.
15. LEONARD STIEBEN V. CONSTR. & GEN. LABORERS UNION, LOCAL 685
Saline County Dist. Court, Dist. 30, Case No. 21084; J. Buzick.
16. Name Unknown-Similar to Rose Constr. Case (No. 18 below)
Johnson County Dist. Court, Dist. 10; J. Brenner.
17. NEATHREY TRUCKING SERVICE V. CHAUFFERS & TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 795
Sedgwick County Dist. Court, Dist. 18, Case No. A-54774.
18. RosE CONSTR. Co., INC. V. INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS UNION,
LOCAL 226
Johnson County Dist. Court, Dist. 10 (Div. 2), Case No. 23026; J. Brenner.
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19. STEFFANS DAIRY FOODS Co. V. TEAMSTERS UNION, LOCAL 795
Sedgwick County Dist. Court, Dist. 18 (Div. 4), Case No. A-46424; J. Brown.
20. TEAMSTERS UNION, LOCAL 795 V. BUILDERS CONSTR. CO.
Sedgwick County Dist. Court, Dist. 18, Case No. A-56427.
21. TEXAS CONSTR. Co. v. H. & P.E., LOCAL 101
Phillips County Dist. Court, Dist. 17, Case No. 9533; J. Hemphill.
22. UNION OF HOTEL, RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES & BARTENDERS, LOCAL 864 v. AYALA
Sedgwick County Dist. Court, Dist. 18, Case No. A-55346.
23. WEEKS FOOD MARKET V. AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS & BUTCHER WORKMEN
Saline County Dist. Court, Dist. 30, Case No. 19820; J. Buzick.
24. WESTERN FOODS Co. v. BAKER
25. WESTERN STAR MILL Co. v. TEAMSTERS UNION, LOCAL 620
Saline County Dist. Court, Dist. 30, Case No. 20756; J. Buzick.
26. WINFIELD DRIVE-IN THEATER V. INT'L ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL EMPLOYEES,
LOCAL 641
Cowley County Dist. Court, Dist. 19; J. White.
